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Dealing with low pay. The Wages Councils
versus a national minimum wage
Timothy Whitton
Université Blaise Pascal/Clermont Ferrand II
The main object of my paper is to draw your attention to Britain's  rather curious way of
handling  statutory  minimum wages.  This  seems  particularly  pertinent  in  the  wake of  the
Maastricht debate, especially since the Social Charter, which includes directives on minimum
wage fixing, nearly brought about the downfall of the present government and in doing so
seriously undermined the future of the whole treaty.
But let me be frank. My interest in minimum wage fixing machinery does not stem solely
from Maastricht. It is the latest “Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill” which
prompted me to talk about the Wages Councils because should they disappear as is stipulated
in the bill, then not only will they be quickly forgotten, but about 250 000 British workers
could find themselves with no minimum wage protection whatsoever.
In June of this year, I contacted the London Low Pay Unit just to make sure that the Wages
Councils had not been abolished but if they have since then, let me apologise for not knowing.
Abolishing the Wages Councils has been on the cards for quite some time now, and it is
difficult in keeping an up-to-date track of events.
 I am fully aware that in this day and age, job creation is by far the most important issue.
Anything that should impede this is therefore in for a rough time. Even so, job creation and
statutory minimum wages are not incompatible in my opinion. The question is therefore how
to blend the two so that they are complementary and not a continual source of strife.
First and foremost, a few words about the Wages Councils. To be fair, I have to take a step
further  back  in  time  and  mention  the  Trades  Boards  from  which  the  Wages  Councils
stemmed. They were created in 1909 and as those who defend minimum wage machinery
enjoy pointing out, the founding father was in many ways Winston Churchill. At this point in
his  political  career,  he  was  nevertheless  “only”  President  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  It  goes
without saying that his name lends a political ambiguity to the evolution of the Councils for
the Conservatives have traditionally been opposed to intervention in the wages market.
Churchill defended the need for some sort of machinery to establish minimum wages by
attacking the “unhealthy conditions of bargaining” brought about by poverty wages. Where
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worker organisation was too feeble to provide its members with a “living wage”, Churchill
recognised the need for government intervention. He believed that in this way not only would
the general standard of living progress but also competition based upon wage cutting would
be nipped in the bud. Enough was enough and although “it was formerly supposed that the
working of the laws of supply and demand would naturally regulate or eliminate that evil”,
the time had come to face up to the glaring reality that something had to be done to suppress
“sweated labour”.1
Churchill obviously provided the basis for many a future diatribe on poverty wages. Even
so, the philanthropic spirit in which he delivered his speeches was not enough to convince
Parliament  into  taking  a  radical  step  to  eradicate  low wages  in  the  shape  of  a  national
statutory minimum wage. Instead, a selective system was created with the establishment of
Trades Boards in certain industries either to encourage collective bargaining or to establish
minimum wages when pay was acknowledged to be appallingly low. In this way, Parliament
gave worker organisations a further chance while providing a fall-back system for the weaker
elements across the industrial spectrum.
In  1918,  Parliament  tried  to  restrict  the  Trades  Boards’  influence  and  the  new  law
underlined the priority given to the boards’ first objective. In the future they were only to be
established  in  industries  where  collective  bargaining  - especially  in  the  field  of  wages  -
needed  a  helping  hand in  order  to  get  off  the  ground.  Nevertheless,  despite  this  official
dampener,  the  Trades  Boards  continued  merrily  on  fixing  subsistence  wages  for  various
sectors of British industry. At the same time, the Whitley councils became another option to
prop  up  flagging  wage  bargaining.2 If  we  add  to  this  the  effects  of  the  Fair  Wages
Resolutions, the complicated nature of minimum wage negotiation and fixing becomes quite
apparent.3 This in fact  is a fair  résumé of the whole story for constant  dilly-dallying and
half-hearted attempts to put an end to poverty wages have had very little impact, especially in
the most vulnerable sectors.
The main upheaval occurred in 1945 when all the Trades Boards were transformed into
Wages Councils. It had become apparent that one of the boards’ main shortcomings was their
inability  to  respond accurately to  those who bore the brunt  of low pay.  Right  across the
industrial spectrum, the worst-off shared the same characteristics and belonged to “categories
of low paid workers” rather than certain branches of industry. The result was that more often
than  not,  the  Trades  Board  for  each  particular  sector  had  only  served  to  improve  the
conditions of a very small fraction of the workers. With the Wages Councils, minimum wage
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fixing was to become more efficient and target the workers who most needed protection in the
form of legislation.
Despite  this  radical  theoretical  change,  the  Wages  Councils  continued  to  be  as
cumbersome as their predecessors. The system reached its peak in 1966 when 66 councils
were  establishing  minimum  wages  for  some  3.5  million  workers.  In  1975,  the  Wages
Councils were modified further due to the Employment Protection Act. They were given the
right to negotiate all pay and working conditions by imitating normal collective bargaining.
Furthermore, any improvements obtained by a “substantial” part of any workforce protected
by a council were automatically conferred to the entire category of workers concerned. As
you may imagine, enforcing statutory minimum wages and in fact policing the whole system
was  becoming  increasingly  difficult.  Documents  containing  any  new  conditions  were
exceedingly long and complicated and had to be deciphered by those who were ill-equipped
to do so. There was rarely a shop-steward readily available, and employers themselves were
often quite incapable of understanding exactly what the law required them to do. The 1979
law complicated  matters  further  by allowing  the  Wages  Councils  to  establish  a  range of
minimum wages for each category of protected workers. I defy here and now even the most
experienced union delegate to understand a Wages Order thirty-two pages long !
In 1986, the Wages Council system was radically simplified. On the one hand, they were
only allowed to establish two minimum hourly rates, one for normal and one for overtime
hours. On the other, all  workers under the age of twenty-one were excluded from Wages
Council  protection.  Even if  this  legislation  may seem a  little  harsh  especially  for  young
workers,  I  do  feel  that  reducing  the  councils'  responsibilities  to  the  very  basics  was  a
necessary and pragmatic step in the right direction. Minimum wage fixing must be simple and
straightforward because the people affected are generally not in a position to gain anything
from petty haggling. Secondly, enforcement of minimum wage legislation must be made as
clear and as easy as possible in order to be self-policed and tamperproof.
Before dealing with this issue further, let me say just a few words about how the Wages
Councils  actually function  - just as the Trades Boards did in fact.  Generally once a year,
employee and employer delegates meet to discuss a pay rise. A panel of three independent
members  is  also  present.  The  employees  submit  a  proposal  which  is  followed  by  the
employers offer. If no new rate is accepted after a short discussion, the three independent
members retire with the employee delegates into a separate chamber and try to persuade them
to revise their demands. This is followed by discussions in private with the employers. The
independent  members  will  sometimes  threaten  to  accept  one  side's  proposal  in  order  to
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encourage the other to rethink its  position.  But,  if  again the delegates  cannot  agree,  then
before the general assembly, the independent members indicate the pay rise  - the President
having of course the casting vote  - which will not meet with their approval. In other words
they do not vote for, but against a new rate of pay. This corresponds to Parliament's wish not
to fix directly but indirectly minimum wages. It also means that the independent members act
as  arbitrators  and  conciliators  rather  than  decision  makers.  This  ambiguous  and  rather
picturesque procedure symbolises once again, in my view, minimum wage fixing in Great
Britain.
When  an  agreement  has  finally  been  reached  it  is  signed  by  the  Minister  and  then
published in the London and Edinburgh Gazette. This is followed by a short delay during
which it is possible to notify the ministry in writing of any disagreement with the new rate.
The minimum rates then become law and every employer covered by the Wages Councils is
sent a Wages Order which sets out new statutory minimum rates of pay. The Wages Orders
are supposed to be posted up where all workers concerned can easily consult them.4
The system is policed by about 70 inspectors who visit establishments and check up on
wages by going through accounts and interviewing personnel. The main inspectorate office is
in  London  and  there  are  nine  regional  offices.  Underpayment  is  a  criminal  offence  and
second-time offenders are usually punished with a fine of anything up to £2000. On the other
hand, the inspectorate has a deliberate policy of leniency with first-time offenders who are
asked to make up arrears as quickly as possible.
After this brief description of Wages Council history and machinery,  let us now take a
closer look at this rather curious and picturesque world. This, incidentally, is exactly what I
did for three years during my doctoral studies.
The  first  thing  that  struck  me  during  my  research  was  the  sheer  number  of  workers
involved. At present, some 2 500 000 employees are in theory covered by statutory minimum
wages. But how many of them are actually paid the minima required by law ? I think that the
answer is very few indeed. Let me remind you that the average Wages Council establishment
employs ten workers. If I rely solely on my own fieldwork in London, I can safely say that
nine times out of ten, Wages Councils  - let alone statutory minima  - are totally unknown.
When  they  are,  the  minima  act  in  the  best  of  cases  as  a  benchmark,  but  are  generally
superseded by the “going rates” whatever these may be. Going rates for London are of course
much  higher  than  elsewhere  for  obvious  reasons.  Nevertheless,  when  using  a  postal
questionnaire  I  looked  further  than  the  capital,  I  discovered  that  75  % of  the  employer
respondents  paid  more  than  the  statutory  minima.  Now  my  questionnaire  was  kindly
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distributed by various employer organisations and therefore respondents were supposed to be
well  aware of their  Wages Council  responsibilities.  This could account  for the fact that a
surprisingly high proportion paid only minimum rates. In other words, the Wages Councils
might in some cases be contrary to workers interests especially when the strength of going
rates is taken into account. Or, the minima established by the Councils might in some cases
correspond to the going rates. In any case, my fieldwork was not extensive enough for me to
answer these queries accurately. Even so, what I was able to perceive, and this is what really
interested me, was the sort of worker who is likely to be paid only the statutory minimum.
Now, going rates usually imply some sort of worker organisation, be it active or passive.
By active I mean trade union affiliation, employer associations, industrial councils etc. By
passive, I imply that going rates correspond to a traditional benchmark which is often subject
to more individual negotiation. From my fieldwork, it appears that in cases where statutory
minima  are  scrupulously  respected  by  employers,  despite  the  impact  of  going  rates,  the
workforce is very similar whatever the sector involved and the most vulnerable workers are
women, part-timers, young and above all unqualified workers. They are also concentrated in
three  or  four  industrial  sectors  which  are  notorious  for  the  low level  of  pay.  Workforce
turnover is high, and training minimal.
The  point  I  am trying  to  make  is  therefore  this:  the  Wages  Councils  are  particularly
effective for part-time women employees who work in the service industries  - hairdressing,
catering, laundry etc. -, retailing and manufacturing, especially in the clothing industry. It will
come as no surprise that the worst off are young unqualified female workers who belong to
the  ethnic  minorities.  Apart  from  these  sectors  where  wage  bargaining  is  weak,  Wages
Council  workers  generally  fend  for  themselves  quite  adequately  and  manage  to  obtain
competitive salaries.
This leads me on to my second point: insofar as a vast majority of Wages Council workers
do  not  benefit  directly  from statutory  minima,  albeit  these  may  act  as  a  benchmark  for
negotiation, why not bring in a national minimum wage to target pittance wages. It seems to
me as if the £3.40 or so advocated by the various pressure groups is far too ambitious, firstly
because it is way above current Wages Council rates. Let me remind you that in June 1992,
these  ranged  between  £2.50  for  the  General  Waste  Material  council  to  £3.10  for  Retail
Bespoke Tailoring.
We are confronted here of course with two main economic tendencies. One says let the
market decide, and the other let the economic partners help the market to decide. I must admit
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that the econometric intricacies involved are rather beyond me but I will even so give a brief
analysis of the situation using my rudimentary knowledge of the forces involved.
If a high national minimum wage is implemented, say £3.40, I cannot deny that demand
might increase from those who benefit from the increase. The problem is that this new wealth
will  not  necessarily  be  reinvested  directly  in  the  low  paying  industries  but  rather  in  a
multitude of sectors which do not necessarily need new money to tackle the low pay problem.
A vicious  circle  is  created whereby low paying industries  have higher  wage bills  and no
subsequent increase in profits. To meet these new costs, employers will have to either put
prices up or dismiss personnel, the result being that demand will decrease. Not all the benefits
of  a  high  minimum  wage  will  disappear  but  enough  for  the  system  to  be  largely
self-defeating.  This  I  feel  is  the  main  weakness  in  the  demand  side  argument,  which  is
especially advocated by groups such as the Low Pay Unit. Even so, I do not feel that their
argument  is  entirely  specious,  far  from it.  It's  a  nice  idea  to  think  that  come what  may,
everyone will earn at least a minimum wage - and I insist on at least - but in advocating a
national economic minimum wage, the chances of implementing a national social minimum
wage are severely reduced. Its the old argument of the wood being hidden by the trees.
I  feel  therefore  that  the  demand  side  argument  does  not  hold  enough  water  to  be
convincing. Nevertheless, the philanthropic spirit behind it all does - the desire to distribute
income slightly more fairly. In other words, it would be far more realistic to justify a national
minimum wage for purely social reasons. By this, I mean that the most vulnerable workers
“should” earn at least a given minimum, not because they are worth this to their employers,
but  it  is  their  minimum due for participating  in society.  A country which has a statutory
minimum wage running parallel to market forces will always have something to fall back on
in wage bargaining.
Therefore, why not implement a national wage at say the lowest current Wages Council
rate, ie. £2.50. The impact on the national aggregate remuneration should be minimal insofar
as very few workers earn less than this. In a nutshell, I think that every effort should be made
to  get  the  national  minimum  wage  on  the  statute  books  and  worry  about  its  evolution
afterwards. Implementing a high minimum wage from the outset can only upset the already
very delicate balance.
You might say that a low minimum wage would exert a downward pressure on some rates.
This I cannot deny. But, from my experience of the wages councils sectors, despite statutory
minima, wages are in most cases a matter of rather haphazard bargaining between employers
and employees. Once again, going rates seem to be far more powerful than the market forces
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which so many pressure groups seem to fear  and there is  no reason why this  should not
continue after implementation of a national minimum. I do believe that those who are not in a
position to bargain would be protected, and those who are would continue to do so. Anyway,
even if a national minimum wage did imply a slight downward drag on wage bargaining,
surely this would be outweighed by the fact that a serious blow would be dealt to sweated
labour.5 Let us not forget that the TUC has been voting clauses in favour of the low pay for
quite some time now.
Another main advantage would be in policing the system. With one single national rate,
widely publicised and therefore known by everyone, offences could be more easily reported.
The present selective machinery means that the inspectorate are forever dealing with updated
rates,  complicated  paperwork and legal  wrangles.  New establishments  and new offenders
appear  every  day.  It  is  no  surprise  that  enforcement  is  a  Herculean  task.  In  many  cases
different  minima  are  applicable  in  one  single  establishment  and  this  only  adds  to  the
confusion.
One main  question remains  to be answered. Why has Britain not adopted the national
minimum wage ? To be frank, I think that in the field of low wages, too much faith has been
placed in the hands of bargaining since the beginning of the century. The Trades Boards were
supposed to disappear when worker organisation affiliation in low paying industries became
adequate enough to ensure a living wage for the workers. But whereas other countries adopted
more  comprehensive  legislation,  Britain  contented  herself  with turning a blind  eye  to the
plight of the low paid by passing the buck to the unions. In the name of wage differentiation,
bargaining has always been upheld as the best way to eradicate low pay, and I do not need to
tell you how fervently the British workforce is supposed to cling to its freedom in this field.
Nevertheless, the truth is that the wage negotiators - be they unions or other organisations -
have had their chance. Despite all the efforts of TGWU, NUPE, GMBU and other unions
which cover low paying sectors, low pay is still a reality. The national minimum has of course
been toyed with by the unions at certain times. Motions have been voted in favour of the low
paid and the Social Contract period was fertile with clauses mentioning the perpetual threat to
standards of living posed by low pay. As you know, the TUC supported the Labour Party's
1987 manifesto clause promising to implement a national minimum wage. Last year,  they
went even further and openly stated that a national minimum of £3.40 was a serious option.
This, you see, is where they have gone horribly wrong. I feel that the national minimum
wage is not a magic wand which you wave in order to eradicate low pay instantly. Neither is
it just a sum of money. Implementation of a social national minimum wage, a wage that goes
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far beyond the mere suppression of pittance wages to embrace citizenship for example, takes
time. Industry has to adjust.
This leads me on to say a few words about our research project which will hopefully deal
exactly  with  this  last  point.  That  is  namely the ability  of  industry to  adapt  to  a  national
minimum wage. In order to accomplish this we need to ask employers what they think, and
why they are so ostensibly hostile for the time being to the across-the-board minimum wage.
This of course implies a large amount of fieldwork, including interviews and probably a series
of questionnaires. Having myself worked in this field for three years, I am fully aware of the
difficulties involved but am sure of one thing: low wages are and have always been a thorn in
the  economic  partners'  side  because  the  people  involved  are  difficult  to  find,  difficult  to
organise,  and hence difficult  to  protect.  Added to  this  is  the  fact  that  the  high  rates  put
forward by the various national minimum wage pressure groups only serve to frighten many
employers  who  are  struggling  to  survive.  To  top  it  all,  the  main  current  concern  is
employment,  not  low wages.  Even  so,  I  do  not  believe  that  “low pay or  no  pay”  is  an
acceptable dichotomy especially in the light of interaction between wages and social benefits.
Should minimum wages in any way hinder employment, it is true that they will be frowned
upon, but surely it is reasonable to put the blame not on the workers who won't accept pittance
wages but on the industrial sectors who cannot afford to pay at least a minimum ? This is the
sort of enquiry I would like to lead, to find out how employers in the low paying sectors could
adjust to a national minimum wage and to what extent the British economy relies on low
wages.
 I believe that a national minimum wage can be much more than just a sum of money
which acts as a cornerstone for wage bargaining. It is in fact potentially multi-dimensional. In
purely  economic  terms,  the  main  concern  is  to  establish  a  minimum wage  at  its  market
clearing level - the lowest one at the outset in my opinion. Then it can become a widely used
benchmark for every citizen in his or her daily life. Employers are kept on their toes because
they know that their workers must be paid a certain minimum. The social services can refer to
it for the numerous benefits which they deal with and any individual has a quick and readily
available landmark.6 In order to meet these requirements, the national minimum wage does
not  need  to  be  necessarily  ambitious.  I  am not  saying  that  any  rate  will  do,  but  at  the
beginning, a low national wage would be feasible.
This is the beauty of the national minimum wage, and the main stumbling block for the
Wages Councils. They at least have the merit of keeping the minimum wage debate alive and
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supposedly adapting to the economic circumstances of each particular industry covered. Even
so, they are archaic, and cumbersome and only reply very half-heartedly to the widespread
threat to an economy posed by low pay. The Wages Councils have had a fair innings, they
have done their time and belong to a museum. Even so, they correspond perfectly to the low
pay status quo of the twentieth century in so far as they enable Britain  - albeit in rather a
picturesque way  - to maintain a shop-front version of minimum wage fixing machinery in
order to meet international requirements.
But Britain should face the facts and state her position once and for all. If she believes that
low pay is not endemic and does not need to be legislated away then so be it. If not, then a
national  minimum  wage  seems  to  be  a  very  plausible  solution.  Either  way,  the  Wages
Councils must go, because they are an obstruction for more concrete legislation to impose
what after all are only minimum wages.
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1 One of Churchill’s Best speeches on the subject can be found in Hansard, 28 April 1909, vol. Iv, c. 388.
2 Whitley Councils: Statutory Joint Industrial Councils or Joint Industrial Councils.
3 The Fair Wages Resolution was voted in 1891. It was modified in 1909 and again in 1946. The first one stated that the 
State should pay regional “going rates”. IN 1909, these requirements were extended to any employer working for the 
State. At the same time, any contracts put out to tender had to be signed beforehand by the Minister concerned. In 1945,
any improvements obtained by collective bargaining were automatically given to the whole sector involved.
4 During my three years of doctoral research, I did not see a single Wages Order posted up in a place of work.
5 In 1991, I telephoned half a dozen small clothing manufacturers in Hackney who had job advertisements up outside 
their workshops. The lowest wages I was offered was 60 pence an hour.
6 The French SMIC is a model of this.
